This article presents an analysis of "spirituality." Ryle said that a belief is not known to be truly held unless one bases crucial action on it; but the qualifications "truly" and "crucial" can be stripped away. Spirituality then becomes consistency of actual action with a belief; or in behavior analytic terms, spirituality is "rule-governed" behavior. Beliefs can function not only as "discriminative stimuli" but also as "reinforcing stimuli." A belief need not correspond to the world as experienced in order to (...) have these functions. Spirituality, thus far in the analysis, is only rule-governed behavior, regardless of the source of the rule and regardless of the content of the rule except that the rule must specify actually performable behavior so that consistency of the action with the belief can be assessed. The separation of action from belief is a form of alienation in a Marxian sense ; to paraphrase Kant, beliefs without actions are empty and actions without beliefs are blind. That is, a belief that is not acted upon is literally useless, and action that is not based on a belief is literally irrational. Alienation is resolved when action is based on "right" motives, which are motives based on a set of principles. Analogously, spirituality is a special kind of rule-governed behavior because the rules that govern this behavior are part of a coherent system that defines "rightness.". (shrink)

Philosophical analyses can aid scientists in several ways. For example, they can help resolve disagreements among scientists about issues such as the relative value of facts versus theories and observations versus inferences; they provide historical descriptions of how science went when it went well or badly and scientists can imitate these descriptions as though they were prescriptive rules; they identify "families" of theories and methodologies on the basis of common uses of key words, which can help scientists understand theories and (...) methodologies other than their own; and they can provide essential backgrounds for scientistsí debates about issues such as final causality, chance causality, and context effects. However, philosophical analyses cannot provide support for empirical findings or theoretical concepts. (shrink)

Nad barjem je veter in moker je zrak, uši imam v tuniki, v nosu prehlad. Z neba štropotajo nalivi dežja, vojak sem na zidu, ne vem sploh, zakaj. Po sivem kaménju se plazi megla, dekle imam v Tungriji, jaz pa spim sam.

In this paper I attempt to trace certain aspects of the evolution of theories of space-time and mechanics as revealed by a brief comparative study of Newtonian theory, Robb's theory, general relativity, and Milne's kinematical relativity. The first object is to emphasise how each theory leaves us in a position in which the succeeding one appears as a perfectly natural next step in the development of ideas. The second object is to show how, in spite of superficial differences in character, (...) the theories all necessarily possess the same general structure constituted by the presence of hypotheses, from which certain general mathematical relations are deduced, which in their turn are used to predict relations between observable quantities. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This paper considers the relationship between G. H. von Wright's solution to the paradoxes of confirmation and his "Principal Theorem of Confirmation". The former utilizes the order of our knowledge of the qualities of confirming instances of an hypothesis; the latter states the way in which an instance contributes to the probability of an hypothesis. It is shown that these two, as stated by von Wright, are logically incompatible. Then the most thorough possible emendation of the paradoxes solution is considered, (...) and it is shown that this still prohibits use of the "Principal Theorem" to confirm hypotheses stating necessary causal conditions, and to confirm by deliberate experiment hypotheses stating sufficient causal conditions. It is concluded that any solution of the paradoxes must rest solely upon the relation of the data to the hypothesis involved. (shrink)

In the for 1952 , pp. 33 ff., Nikolaos M. Kontoleon published a most interesting inscription from the shrine of Archilochos on Paros. It was inscribed, as preserved, on two orthostats, which probably formed part of the structure of the hearth or bothros where offerings to the hero were made. There is much of interest to scholars in this new discovery, which is very fully and carefully interpreted by Kontoleon, and has been further discussed by Werner Peck . In this (...) article the present writer wishes to confine himself to some comments on the new evidence about responses of the Delphic oracle supplied by the inscription. This material is all found on the first of the two orthostats, and falls into two categories: responses connected with the setting up of the shrine, and responses connected with the life of Archilochus. (shrink)

The Hellenistic temple of Apollo at Didyma presents several unique features in its plan. In its exterior it resembles the typical large Ionic temple of Asia Minor with a double colonnade surrounding it, no opisthodomus, and a pronaos containing three rows of four columns each. But at this point the plan of the temple was modified in the strangest manner. For the pronaos does not lead by a great central doorway into the cella, but where the doorway should come, the (...) worshipper entering the building found himself faced with a blank wall 1·495 rn high with above it a colossal opening 5·63 m wide. Consequently the worshipper in the pronaos could not even look directly into the sanctuary. Instead, just above his eye-level beyond the embrasure of this ‘window’ stretched the floor of a large room, 14·04 m by 6·73 m with its roof supported on two columns. Through this room's central door the spectator on ground level outside could catch a glimpse of the upper part of the naiskos in the inner court. (shrink)